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Does private tutoring increase parental choice and improve student achievement, or does
it exacerbate social inequalities and impose heavy costs on households, possibly without
improving student outcomes? Private tutoring is now a major component of the edu-
cation sector in many developing countries, yet education policy too seldom acknowl-
edges or makes use of it. This survey of the literature examines the extent of private
tutoring, identifies the factors that explain its growth, and analyzes its cost-effectiveness
in improving student academic performance. It also presents a framework for assessing
the efficiency and equity effects of tutoring. The results suggest that even taking equity
concerns into account, tutoring can raise the effectiveness of the education system under
certain reasonable assumptions. Guidance is offered for attacking corruption and other
problems that diminish the benefits of private tutoring. JEL codes: I21, I22, D10.
Developing country policymakers recognize that education is a key determinant of
individual productivity and economywide growth. But their sector diagnoses and
policy attention have focused on public schools. Much less attention has been
paid to the private school sector, and policy discussion rarely mentions what is
emerging as a third important education sector: the private tutoring industry.
In many countries, private tutoring has arisen as a parallel education sector that
provides supplementary instruction to students enrolled in the public school system.
Substantial private tutoring industries can be found in countries as economically
and geographically diverse as Cambodia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Japan, Kenya,
Morocco, Romania, Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
This survey cites evidence on the prevalence of tutoring in 23 developing and
developed countries. In almost all of them, 25–90 percent of students at certain
levels of education are receiving or recently received private tutoring. In some
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countries, such as the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) and Turkey, spending
by households on private tutoring now rivals public sector education
expenditures.
Private tutoring has elicited mixed responses from policymakers. In some
countries it is ignored; in others it is actively controlled and regulated. Private
tutoring has been banned at various times in Cambodia, Korea, Mauritius, and
Myanmar (Bray 1999a), out of concern that it exacerbates social inequalities,
disrupts the public education system, and fails to increase academic performance
or build human capital.
Policymakers need evidence to formulate good policy toward private tutoring.
What factors (micro and macro) drive the demand for private tutoring? Do only
rich households use private tutoring? How is private tutoring different from
private or public education? What effects does private tutoring have on students’
academic performance? Is private tutoring a cost-effective form of education? Does
the evidence suggest that increased use of private tutoring is a welcome develop-
ment or one governments should discourage?
Policymakers may find it preferable to formulate views on these questions
before private tutoring becomes even more entrenched. Once it emerges as a
major industry—especially if wealthier parents see it providing competitive advan-
tages to their children—it will likely be harder for governments to adjust policy in
ways that threaten vested interests.
This article reviews what is known about the determinants and effects of
private tutoring and analyzes the equity and efficiency issues, with a focus on
developing countries. It begins by establishing the economic importance of private
tutoring in much of the developed and developing world. It then provides a simple
framework of the supply of and demand for education, which guides the discus-
sion of equity and efficiency issues. The next sections review the determinants of
private tutoring, from both a micro and a macro perspective, and the effects of
tutoring on student achievement, paying special attention to the statistical pro-
blems associated with identifying these effects and to recent studies that have
addressing these problems. The last section uses these results and the theoretical
framework to discuss the efficiency and equity implications of private tutoring,
explore their implications for policy toward tutoring, and identify areas that may
warrant more research.
The Widespread Phenomenon of Private Tutoring
Private tutoring is defined here as fee-based tutoring that provides supplementary
instruction to children in academic subjects they study in the mainstream
education system.1 Because the literature focuses primarily on tutoring for
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children or adolescents paid for by their households, tutoring can generally be
considered a form of private education. However, the definition is broad enough
to cover special tutoring programs financed by other sources, including the gov-
ernment (for example, remedial education programs).
There are good reasons why a private supplementary tutoring sector might
emerge to complement the public and private schooling systems. Private tutoring
can provide more individualized instruction than is possible in public schools,
using a more flexible delivery mechanism. The private tutoring industry is also
differentiated from the private school sector in that its existence depends on the
mainstream education system; it does not stand alone as an independent edu-
cational activity. This aspect of private tutoring helps explain why it has been
referred to as “shadow education” (Bray 1999a). Private tutoring is also less
formal and more flexible than private schooling: it can include not only one-to-
one tutoring but also group classes, it can be provided not only by full-time tutors
and teachers but also by university students, retired teachers, university pro-
fessors, and community members (Russell 1997). Because it supplements rather
than replaces the public sector, the combination of public schooling and private
tutoring is also more affordable for many households than private education
would be.
Japan has been a pioneer in the provision of this type of supplementary edu-
cation. Private tutoring has long been a huge commercial industry in Japan, with
annual revenues reaching an estimated $14 billion by the mid-1990s. Nine
private tutoring schools were already listed on the Japanese stock exchange at
that time, and the tutoring sector had become a “crucial component of Japanese
education” (Russell 1997). Many Japanese students enroll in intensive tutoring
programs during school vacations, including the important New Year’s holiday.
To stimulate school spirit, several private tutoring schools ( juku) have had their
students wear white headbands similar to those once worn in battle by samurai
warriors (Rohlen 1980). About 30 percent of university students spend additional
years after high school graduation cramming for their university entrance exam-
inations, often in specialized private tutoring classes. At the top-ranked schools,
more than 60 percent of students may have spent time after high school prepar-
ing for these exams (Ono 2007).
Japan is not alone in supporting a large and vibrant private tutoring industry.
Tutoring is now widespread in many parts of the world, including developing
countries (appendix table A.1).
Certain patterns are clear. First, while the incidence of tutoring appears
highest in East Asia, private tutoring is an important phenomenon in countries
of different sizes, levels of economic development, political institutions, and
locations. In some cases, spending on private tutoring approaches the level of
spending on the formal public school system. In Korea, for example, households
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spent 2.9 percent of GDP on private tutoring in 1998—almost as much the 3.4
percent of GDP the public sector allocates to education (Kim and Lee 2004).
In Turkey households spend more than 1.4 percent of GDP on private
tutoring—close to the 2.0 percent the country spends on public education
(Tansel and Bircan 2006).
Second, private tutoring is an important phenomenon not only for upper-sec-
ondary students preparing for university exams but also for students at the
primary and lower-secondary levels. In some countries, such as Japan, it is wide-
spread among upper-secondary graduates as well.
Third, the private tutoring industry appears to be growing in many countries,
both in absolute terms and relative to the formal education sector. The percentage
of students receiving tutoring is rising in Kenya and Mauritius, and the number
of private tutoring firms is rising in Canada and Turkey (see table A.1).2 Evidence
on tutoring expenditures also supports the notion that the sector is growing. In
Korea, for example, household spending as a share of GDP on private tutoring
rose continuously, from 0.7 percent of GDP in 1977 to 1.2 percent in 1990 and
2.9 percent in 1998 (Kim and Lee 2004). Finally, anecdotal reports suggest that
private tutoring is expanding in other countries as well. In both low-income
countries (such as Vietnam; Dang 2007a) and high-income countries (such as
the United States; Fuchs 2002; Borja 2005), some households in some areas have
begun sending their children to private tutoring to give them an edge as early as
preschool.
A Framework of Private Tutoring Supply and Demand
A simple graphical framework based on the standard microeconomic theory of
supply and demand is useful in interpreting the private tutoring phenomenon.
Consider the supply of and demand for education by a typical household where
private tutoring is available (figure 1). The supply of education is represented by
the supply curves S0 for private education, S1 for public education, and S2 for
public education with private tutoring. S1 is different from S2 in that while the
two curves share a common solid upward-sloping part ending at point A,
S1includes the solid vertical line rising from point A while S2 includes a dashed
diagonal line starting from point A. (It is possible to think about the dashed line
as the supply curve for private tutoring alone.)
The rationale for the vertical part of S1 (starting at point A) is that regardless
of consumer demand, after a certain point public schools reach their capacity
limit, preventing them from offering as much education—in terms of both quan-
tity and quality—as parents or students want (that is, supply becomes perfectly
inelastic).3 By contrast, the dashed portion of the supply curve S2 ( public
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education with private tutoring) is flatter than the vertical part of S1, indicating
the ability of private tutoring to meet the demand for education where the public
education system cannot. This portion of S2 is steeper than the lower part of S1,
reflecting the assumption that even where public school is not free, private
tutoring usually costs the household more than public schooling does.4
Even if tuition is not charged, a household incurs certain costs in sending a
child to school (for example, school-related fees, the opportunity cost of the child
not working). Household demand for education is represented by the demand
curve D1 (low demand) or D2 (high demand). The demand curve D2 represents a
household that is assumed to have higher income, stronger education preferences,
higher expectations about future returns, or some combination of these variables
relative to a household whose demand is given by D1. (Other factors, such as the
price of substitute goods and the number of buyers in the market, also shift the
demand curve. The focus here is strictly on the factors cited above.)
The amount of education the household consumes is represented by the
amount on the horizontal axis corresponding to the point where the supply and
demand curves meet. If the representative household’s demand for education is
represented by the demand curve D2, the amount of public education the house-
hold consumes is Q2. In the presence of private tutoring the same household can
consume a larger amount of education (Q*2), because the supply curve is no
longer constrained by the vertical segment rising at point A. Were the household
instead to enroll all their children in private school, the consumed amount of
education would be lower, at Q0.
Figure 1. Education Supply and Demand with Private Tutoring
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This “standard framework” underlies the discussion of the determinants and
welfare consequences of tutoring. It incorporates certain assumptions that may
not always be valid. One such assumption is that the market for private tutoring
is competitive and that households are free to choose whether to purchase tutor-
ing services. A second is that public schooling reaches a strict capacity constraint
after a certain point, which is likely a better description of the short run than the
long run. The last section of this article explores how relaxing these assumptions
affects the analytical and policy conclusions.
Drivers of Private Tutoring
To understand the equity and productivity effects of the large and growing private
tutoring sector and design effective policies, it is essential to understand the micro
and macro factors that create demand for tutoring. Factors at the micro level may
include the characteristics of individuals, households, schools, and communities.
Macro-level factors may include the share of public spending allocated to public
education, the characteristics of the education system and labor market, and
national cultural values. Together these factors determine the level and slope of
the tutoring demand curve for society as a whole. This section presents the evi-
dence from the literature on both sets of explanatory factors.
Micro Factors
Standard economic theory would suggest that certain factors increase household
demand for education: households’ income, preference for education, and expec-
tations about the returns to education for their children. These factors explain the
heterogeneity of demand across household types. Compared with households on
demand curve D1, which consume no private tutoring given the supply curve S2,
households on demand curve D2 consume Q*2 – Q2 of private tutoring.
Empirical research supports the theoretical prediction about which factors
increase demand. Studies of Egypt (Assad and El-Badawy 2004), Japan (Stevenson
and Baker 1992), Korea (Kim and Lee 2004), Turkey (Tansel and Bircan 2006), and
Vietnam (Dang 2007b) are highlighted because they draw on nationally representa-
tive data. The private tutoring sector is also relatively prominent in all of these
countries, which together capture some of the geographic variation in the phenom-
enon. (Buchmann 2002, Davies 2004, and Psacharopoulous and Papakonstantinou
2005 investigate the determinants of private tutoring using smaller data sets.)
The variables that most influence consumption of private tutoring in these
studies are household income (household wealth in Egypt, household expenditure
in Turkey and Vietnam); parental education; and urban location (table 1).
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The last two variables arguably correspond to household preferences for edu-
cation. These results are not unexpected, but they are surprisingly consistent
across countries and fairly robust to the models used.5
Other factors that may matter across countries are grade level and household
size. In Egypt students in diploma-granting grades spend more on private tutoring
(Assad and El-Badawy 2004). In Vietnam the closer students are to the last grade
in their current school level the more they spend on private tutoring (Dang
2007b). In Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam the number of children in the household
is negatively correlated with private tutoring expenditures (Kim and Lee 2004;
Tansel and Bircan 2006; Dang 2007b). Presumably, the grade-level pattern
reflects the use of private tutoring to prepare for school-leaving examinations. The
household-size effect hints at the much-studied tradeoff between quantity and
Table 1. Leading Determinants of Private Tutoring in Selected Countries
Egypt, Arab Rep.
of Japan
Republic of
Koreaa Turkeyb
Vietnamc
Primary
students
Lower-secondary
students
Independent variable
Per child
expenditure on
private tutoring
Participation
in after-school
private
tutoring
Per child
expenditure
on private
tutoring
Log of
household
expenditure
on private
tutoring
Log of per child
expenditure on
private tutoring
Log of per child
expenditure on
private tutoring
Household
income
Mixed resultsd *** *** *** *** ***
Father’s years of
schooling
** *** *** ** Not significant *
Mother’s years of
schooling
Not significant *** *** *** * Not significant
Urban location *** *** *** *** * Not significant
Number of
observations
6,114 3,053 6,576 3,898 2,347 1,179
Econometric
model
Tobit Logit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; ***significant at the 1 percent level.
aSignificance level of the urban variable is inferred from the strong significance levels for the dummy variables
indicating living in high-density residential areas, living in Seoul, and living in metropolitan city or small or
medium-size city.
bHousehold income is the log of total household expenditure. Father’s years of schooling are for household
heads.
cHousehold income is the log of household expenditure per capita.
dSignificance level of household income is inferred from that of dummy variables indicating households in
different wealth quintiles, which range from insignificant to highly significant.
Source: Estimates are from the following: Egypt, Assaad and El-Badawy (2004); Japan, Stevenson and Baker
(1992); Republic of Korea, Kim and Lee (2004); Turkey, Tansel and Bircan (2006); and Vietnam, Dang (2007b).
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quality (number of children and average child educational achievement; see, for
example, Becker and Lewis 1973; Blake 1989). This variable is likely to be
endogenous (see the next section), which may bias the estimates. Not all of these
variables are used in all of the studies. It is thus not possible to investigate whether
these patterns hold for all five countries or to draw firm conclusions from them.
Other variables that affect spending on private tutoring vary from country to
country. This diversity of findings may reflect differences in the models or in the
variables available in the data sets. It could also reflect country-level differences
in tutoring patterns, perhaps as a result of differences in institutions, cultures, or
relative prices.
Do students receive private tutoring for remedial or enrichment purposes? Are
most students who receive tutoring performing at levels below or above their (con-
ditionally) expected levels? Analyzing data from the 1995 Third International
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) in 41 countries Baker and others (2001)
show that in three-fourths of these countries private tutoring is used significantly
more often by low math achievers than by high achievers (controlling for family
income, student, and community characteristics). They show that the probability
of receiving private tutoring increases by 3.5 percent for each one-point decrease
in TIMSS math scores in Denmark, Germany, and the United States.
The core explanatory factors common to all studies—income, parental edu-
cation, urban location—echo those usually found to be important determinants
of schooling attainment and performance in developing countries. In their study
of 35 developing countries, for example, Filmer and Pritchett (1999) find that
household wealth is strongly related to the educational attainment of children
nearly everywhere. The multicountry analysis by Hanushek and Luque (2003)
finds that on average parental education and family asset ownership are as
important in explaining children’s test scores in developing countries as they are
in developed countries. Tansel (1997, 1998) finds that parental education, house-
hold consumption, and urban location are associated with higher educational
attainment in Coˆte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Turkey.
Macro Factors
Several factors are likely drivers of the demand for private tutoring at the macro
level. First, the transition to a market economy substantially increased the
amounts of private tutoring (supplied and demanded) in countries where it had
not existed, including China, Vietnam, some African countries, and many Eastern
European transition economies (Bray 1999a).
Second, tight linkages between education and work may result in intense
competition for more education and thus private tutoring (Stevenson and Baker
1992). Private returns in the labor force are generally higher to higher education
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than to secondary education (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004), and the gap
appears to be widening in many developing and developed countries (Brunello,
Comi, and Lucifora 2000; Bourguignon and Rogers forthcoming). These high
returns can lead to intensely competitive behavior by students and their parents,
including the use of private tutoring to increase chances of university admission.
An extreme form of these linkages is “diploma disease” (Dore 1976), whereby
firms and governments rely heavily on a university degree as an initial screening
tool for employment, in the belief that the degree signals skills that contribute to
productivity but are hard to measure directly. This phenomenon has arguably
fueled the demand for private tutoring in a number of countries (see Rogers 1996
for a model of this effect based on the experiences of Japan and Korea).
Third, parents may resort to private tutoring to compensate for the poor
quality of a deficient public education system (Kim and Lee 2004). Low pay levels
and weak monitoring of teachers in the public system can also cause teachers
to force tutoring on students (Buchmann 1999; Silova and Bray 2006a), as
formalized in a theoretical model by Biswal (1999).6
Fourth, cultural values may explain why private tutoring is more prevalent
in some countries. Such values may be particularly important in East Asia (Bray
1999a).
Little formal empirical research has been done to test these hypotheses. The
only cross-country study that has looked at the macro (economywide) factors
determining the use of private tutoring is Baker and others (2001). Using data on
41 countries participating in the Third TIMSS assessment, they find that higher
public education expenditures (as a share of GNP) and gross enrollment rates
predict lower use of private tutoring. A high-stakes testing system has no signifi-
cant impact on private tutoring.
The first result suggests that private tutoring is more popular in countries with
weak and deficient public education systems. The analysis does not control for per
capita income levels, however. This omission may bias the results, because
income levels are highly correlated with both public education expenditures and
gross enrollment rates.7
Impact of Private Tutoring on Student Learning
Understanding the policy implications of the growth of the private tutoring industry
requires understanding not only its determinants—who is investing in tutoring and
why—but also the consequences for those being tutored. Does spending on private
tutoring yield substantial returns for individual learners? For society as a whole?
In standard models the presumption is that private tutoring must yield substan-
tial increases in learning, because most students consider tutoring an investment
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rather than consumption. If households consist of well-informed, sovereign consu-
mers focused on learning—and ultimately on increased productivity in the work-
force—one would expect significantly positive returns to individuals. But this is
not the only possibility, for three reasons. First, consumers could be poorly
informed about returns. Even econometricians find it challenging to tease out the
returns to tutoring (as discussed below); it may be very hard for households to
know for sure that their investment will pay off, particularly as any wage returns
may be realized only after many years. Second, consumers may not be sovereign:
parents who pay for tutoring may have objectives other than improving their chil-
dren’s learning and productivity, such as finding child care. Third, students may
view tutoring as consumption rather than investment.
Endogeneity: Unobserved Factors may Affect Both Investment in Private
Tutoring and Student Performance
Analyzing the evidence on learning gains attributable to tutoring is tricky
because of the potential endogeneity of tutoring, which many studies have failed
to address. For this reason this review of the literature focuses on the results from
the handful of studies that have dealt with endogeneity.
A naive first approach to estimating the effects of private tutoring on perform-
ance would be to use micro-level data to estimate the following equation:
A ¼ aþ bT þ gXþ e
where A is a student’s academic performance; T is the student’s attendance at or spending
on private tutoring classes; X is a vector of other student, household, school, and commu-
nity characteristics (for example, the student’s age and gender, the household’s socioeco-
nomic status and place of residence, and school quality); e is the error term; and a, b, and
g are the parameters to be estimated, with b the estimated return to private tutoring.
This approach, at least as it is usually implemented, is likely to yield unreliable
estimates of the coefficient on private tutoring, because students who receive
private tutoring may differ in various unobserved but important dimensions from
those who do not. One such dimension is the level of parental concern about
their children’s education. This variable is hard to measure and is therefore
usually excluded from these analyses. Yet parents who place high value on their
children’s education may directly assist their children to succeed in school by
helping them with their homework, for example, while also spending money on
private tutoring.
Another example is a student’s motivation for studies, which is also difficult to
measure. Highly motivated students may be more willing to receive private tutor-
ing than their less motivated peers, but they are likely also to outperform students
who did not receive tutoring for reasons unrelated to tutoring.
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Private tutoring is thus endogenous, in that these unobserved factors affect
both investment in private tutoring and the performance at school. If not properly
controlled for in regression analysis, these unobserved characteristics will end up
in the error term, rendering the estimation results inconsistent and unreliable.
This selection bias is commonly addressed in other contexts in the education litera-
ture, such as estimating whether religious and other private schools yield better
student outcomes than public schools do (see, for example, Bedi and Garg 2000
and Newhouse and Beegle 2006 for public–private comparisons in Indonesia).
Three econometric techniques have been used to deal with the endogeneity of
private tutoring. The first—and perhaps cleanest—approach is to run experiments
that randomly assign students into comparable treatment and control groups.
With such a set-up, researchers can use a straight difference-in-difference com-
parison of the gains in education outcomes for the two groups to estimate the
returns to private tutoring.8 Even with this arrangement, however, interpreting
the results is challenging, because students cannot be assigned to purchase
private tutoring. Such studies must provide free tutoring, which may differ from
tutoring that is paid for. Providing tutoring free seems likely to reduce its effective-
ness in promoting learning; if anything, this should bias downward the estimates
of the returns to tutoring.
A second approach, implemented ex post using observational data, relies on
quasi-experimental identification of the effects of tutoring by using a difference-
in-difference analysis as a program is rolled out across the country. Like the first
approach, this approach has had to rely on tutoring provided by the program
rather than purchased by households.
The third approach is to rely on instrumental variables that correlate with
private tutoring attendance, expenditure, or both but that do not correlate with
unobserved characteristics such as parental concern or student motivation.9 This
approach has the advantage of measuring the effects of private tutoring sought as
a result of household decisions rather than government programs. The disadvan-
tage is that such estimates are likely to be more sensitive to econometric assump-
tions than are experimental and quasi-experimental estimates.
Evidence on the Impact of Private Tutoring
Research on the impact of private tutoring can be divided into studies that control
for the endogeneity of private tutoring and those that do not (table 2). In addition
to the standard type of tutoring paid for by the household, some studies include
remedial education programs financed by sources other than households.
Studies that do not control for endogeneity yield mixed results on the impact of
private tutoring on academic performance. They indicate that private tutoring
has positive impacts in Japan (Stevenson and Baker 1992), Kenya (Buchmann
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Table 2. Effects of Private Tutoring in Selected Countries
Study Country Year Level/grade/age Main effect Comment
Studies that control for endogeneity
Mischo and Haag
(2002)
Germany 1998–99 Grades 5–11 Receiving private tutoring improved
academic performance and
motivational variables.
Study uses a form of matching in
which students in tutoring identify a
match in an attempt to account for
unobserved differences between
tutoring participants and
nonparticipants.
Banerjee et al.
(2007)
India 2001–04 Grades 3 and 4 Remedial education program increased
average test scores for all children in
treated schools 0.28 standard
deviation. Computer-assisted learning
program increased math scores 0.47
standard deviations. One year after
the program, initial gains were
reduced to 0.1 standard deviation.
Study uses randomized experiment
method.
Suryadarma
et al. (2006)
Indonesia 2002–03 Grade 4 Private tutoring had no impact on
mathematics or dictation scores.
Variable indicating school clustering in
terms of private tutoring is used as
instrument for private tutoring.
Lavy and
Schlosser (2005)
Israel 1999–2001 Underperforming high
school students
Remedial education program increased
the mean pass rate for the
baccalaureate exam 3–4 percentage
points for participating schools and
11–12 percentage points for
participating students. Program
expenditure per participant
represented about 40 percent of the
annual expenditure per high school
student.
Study uses both difference-in-difference
and instrumental variables methods.
Instrumental variables for the
proportion of students participating in
the program include the interaction
terms of school size, year dummy
variable, and treatment status.
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Ono (2007) Japan 1995 Male high school and
university graduates
Years spent after high school
graduation cramming in private
tutoring centers (ronin) improved the
quality of the university that students
attend, thus raising earnings
indirectly (through this improvement
in college quality).
Study uses instrumental variables
method but does not control for other
household, school, or community
characteristics (such as parental
education or household income).
Briggs (2001) United
States
1990–92 High school Commercial private tutoring courses
increased SAT math scores 14–15
points, SAT verbal scores 6–8 points,
and ACT math and English scores 0–
0.6 points; they decreased ACT
reading scores 0.6–0.7 points.
Study does not report variables used as
instruments for private tutoring and
does not control for school
characteristics.
Jacob and Lefgren
(2004)
1997–99 Grades 3 and 6 Summer remedial programs increased
math and reading achievement by
about 12 percent of average annual
learning gains for third-graders and 6
percent for sixth-graders.
Study uses regression discontinuity
method.
Dang (2007b) Vietnam 1997–98 Primary and lower-
secondary school
Private tutoring improved students’
academic performance.
Study uses private tutoring fees
charged by schools as instruments for
students receiving private tutoring.
Studies that do not control for endogeneity
Stevenson and
Baker (1992)
Japan 1980–82 High school seniors For students in the first year out of
high school, practice exams increased
probability of entering university 16
percent; correspondence courses
increased probability 25 percent. For
students in the second year out of
high school, attending special
tutoring school increased probability
Continued
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R
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1
7
3
Table 2. Continued
Study Country Year Level/grade/age Main effect Comment
of entering university 80 percent.
Having a private tutor significantly
reduced this probability, but this
result most likely reflects the remedial
character of this form of private
tutoring in Japan.
Buchmann
(2002)
Kenya 1995 13–18-year-olds Private tutoring reduced the chance of
repeating grades and increased
student academic performance.
Study does not control for school
characteristics.
Lee and others
(2004)
Republic
of Korea
2000–01 Middle and high school Preclass tutoring (private tutoring that
teaches the school curriculum at least
one month ahead of schedule) had no
short- or long-term effects on student
academic performance.
Study does not appear to account for
student motivation for receiving
private tutoring.
Cheo and Quah
(2005)
Singapore Not reported Grade 8 Time spent with private tutor had
negative impact on student academic
performance.
Ha and Harpham
(2005)
Vietnam 2002 Eight-year-olds Private tutoring had no significant
effect on writing and multiplication
test scores but doubled reading scores.
Study does not control for school
characteristics.
Source: Authors’ summary based on cited data sources.
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2002), and Vietnam (Ha and Harpham 2005) and negative impacts in Korea
(Lee, Kim, and Yoon 2004) and Singapore (Cheo and Quah 2005). The results
from these studies should be interpreted with caution, however, because of the
endogeneity resulting from self-selection into tutoring (as some of the studies
acknowledge). In addition, two of these studies do not control for school charac-
teristics, which may further bias the estimation results.
Studies that control in some credible way for the endogeneity of private
tutoring generally find that private tutoring boosts student academic perform-
ance. Tutoring is found to increase test scores in India (Banerjee and others
2007), mean pass rates on the baccalaureate exams in Israel (Lavy and Schlosser
2005), the quality of universities students attend in Japan (Ono 2007), Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT) and ACT test scores (except for ACT reading scores) and aca-
demic performance in the United States (Briggs 2001; Jacob and Lefgren 2004),10
and student academic performance in Vietnam (Dang 2007b). The sole exception
is in Indonesia (Suryadarma and others 2006), where tutoring was not associated
with higher performance by fourth graders.11 No studies appear to have exam-
ined whether the estimated negative correlations between private tutoring and
achievement in Korea and Singapore change when endogeneity is properly
addressed.
The three studies on India, Israel, and Vietnam are examined in some detail
because they include cost data, making it possible to consider both the impact of
tutoring on academic performance and the cost-effectiveness of tutoring.
Furthermore, these studies reflect the variation in the usage and financing of
tutoring. They include both low-income (India and Vietnam) and high-income
(Israel) countries; they include estimation of tutoring effects on students of all
academic abilities (Vietnam) and on underperforming students (India and Israel);
and they include tutoring that is financed by a nongovernmental organization
(NGO; India), publicly financed (Israel), and financed by households (Vietnam).
NGO-financed Remedial Tutoring in India. Pratham, a large Indian NGO, financed
the implementation of a two-year in-school randomized tutoring program that
targets poor children in two large cities. This remedial education program
targeted children in grades 3 or 4 who had not mastered basic skills. These stu-
dents were taken out of their classrooms and given two hours of supplemental
instruction each day by young women from the community.
Banerjee and others (2007) find that this tutoring program improved student
test scores by large and statistically significant amounts. Children randomly
assigned to the treatment group improved their test scores by 0.6 standard devi-
ations in the second year; control group children remaining in the regular class-
room did not benefit. Overall, the test scores of children in schools participating in
the program rose 0.14 standard deviations in the first year and 0.28 standard
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deviations in the second year. These gains fell substantially one year after the
program ended, however. More research is needed on the long-term impact of
such programs.
Banerjee and others attribute the relative success of the program to regular tea-
chers’ lack of motivation to help lagging students and to the common background
shared by the students and the tutors. They also show that this tutoring program
is cost-effective. At about $10–$15 a month, the tutors’ salary is equivalent to
just 6–10 percent of the salary of a starting teacher. They calculate that scaling
up the tutoring program would be much more cost-effective than hiring new tea-
chers, at least in terms of raising test scores. The program, which has already
reached tens of thousand of children across India, is estimated to cost about
$2.25 per student a year.
A second program used computers, rather than human tutors, to deliver the
tutorials. This program raised math scores by 0.36 standard deviations the first
year and 0.54 standard deviations the second year. However, it is much more
expensive than the first program, at $15.18 per student a year.
Government-financed Remedial Tutoring in Israel. Israel has been operating a reme-
dial education program for underperforming high-school students since 1999. By
2004 the program was reaching about a third of all high schools (Lavy and
Schlosser 2005). The objective of the program is to increase the number of stu-
dents who earn baccalaureate certificates by providing them with increased
instructional time. In each school the program identifies up to five students in the
10th, 11th, and 12th grades judged most likely to fail the exams. The classroom
teachers then provide these students with after-school tutoring in the subjects in
which they are weak.
To examine the effects of the program, Lavy and Schlosser (2005) use a quasi-
experimental difference-in-difference methodology (supplemented by instrumental
variables as an alternative identification strategy). Their approach relies on the
fact that the program was rolled out over time, allowing them to compare learning
gains in schools that received it early on with those in schools that received it later.
Lavy and Schlosser find that the program had a positive impact on both the
students and the participating schools. The program increased the probability of a
tutored student earning a baccalaureate certificate by 12 percentage points, an
average improvement of 22 percent over the base rate. The targeted schools saw
an increase of about 3.3 percentage points in mean pass rates on the baccalaure-
ate exams, equivalent to an improvement of 6 percent over the base rate. The
program did not appear to affect nontutored students.
At $1,100 per tutored student (about 40 percent of annual expenditure per
high school student in Israel) the average cost of the program is very high.
Nevertheless, Lavy and Schlosser estimate the program’s internal rate of return at
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20 percent. Although this makes the remedial tutoring program less cost-effective
than two other incentive-based programs in Israel examined by the authors, 20
percent is an impressive rate of return.
Household-financed Tutoring in Vietnam. Private tutoring is very popular in
Vietnam, with about 34 percent of households with children in school purchasing
private lessons. Ninety percent of these households allocate 1–5 percent of total
household expenditure to private tutoring. Some 31 percent of primary students,
56 percent of lower-secondary students, and 77 percent of upper-secondary
school students receive private tutoring (Dang 2007b).
Dang addresses the endogeneity of tutoring with an instrumental variables
strategy that uses tutoring prices as the instrument. Using data from the Vietnam
Living Standards Surveys for 1992–93 and 1997–98 he shows that private
tutoring improves student academic performance. After controlling for other indi-
vidual, household, school, and community characteristics he finds that raising
annual spending on private tutoring from 0 to 20,000 dong (D)—about $1.50 in
1998, equivalent to about 0.4 percent of mean consumption or 2 percent of
spending on education by households with children in school—has strong positive
effects on performance. For primary school students, tutoring reduces the prob-
ability of obtaining a “poor” academic ranking by about 1 percentage point,
reduces the probability of average performance by 4 percentage points, and
increases the probability of good or excellent performance by 5 percentage points.
For the same increase in expenditure at the lower-secondary level it reduces
the probability of poor performance by about 1 percentage points, reduces the
probability of average performance by 7 percentage points, and increases the
probability of good or excellent performance by 8 percentage points.
These estimates can be used to make a rough calculation of the cost-effective-
ness of tutoring in promoting grade progression among lower-secondary school
students. Students with “poor” academic rankings usually have to repeat grades
in Vietnam. A year of lower-secondary schooling has a total cost (direct costs to
households and the government plus assumed opportunity cost of forgone wages)
of about D3 million a year. Everything else being equal, if the household’s aim is
for the child to complete a given level of education, a reduction of 1 percentage
point in the probability of earning a “poor” academic ranking reduces the
expected costs of grade repetition by about D30,000. Similar calculations for
primary students also show that D20,000 worth of private tutoring reduces the
expected costs of grade repetition by about D25,000.12 This means that the
benefits from lower repetition rates alone exceed the costs of tutoring. The total
benefits are likely to be much higher, because these calculations do not account
for any economic benefits of better academic ranking categories or for avoided
psychological costs associated with grade repetition.
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Interpreting the Evidence
Recent studies that have dealt with the endogeneity of tutoring and estimated
cost-effectiveness find that private tutoring has strong positive returns. Some
caution is needed in interpreting the evidence, however, for several reasons. First,
this line of analysis is made difficult by the nature of private tutoring transactions:
typically it is the household (rather than an NGO or government) that decides
whether to purchase private tutoring. It is hard to imagine how that decision
could be randomized across households in order to obtain clean measurement of
the returns to privately purchased tutoring. At best a government could random-
ize access to potential tutors—by, for example, flooding certain randomly chosen
communities with unemployed graduates—and then examine whether house-
holds chose to consume more tutoring and if so how it affected student
performance.
Second, estimation results from these studies should be considered in context
and neither generalized to all students nor narrowed to specific subgroups of
tutored students. Most of the studies cited in table 2 estimate only the average
return for all students enrolled in tutoring. This approach implicitly assumes that
all students share the same returns to private tutoring, regardless of their innate
ability or socioeconomic background (exceptions include the studies by Jacob and
Lefgren 2004; Lavy and Schlosser 2005; and Banerjee and others 2007.) If this
homogeneity assumption is violated, the estimated benefits of tutoring will not
apply to subgroups and may be biased as well (see Heckman, Lochner, and Todd
2006 and Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil 2006 for discussions of the heterogen-
eity in returns to education in instrumental variables models). For example, while
the studies for India (Banerjee and others 2007), Israel (Lavy and Schlosser
2005), and the United States (Jacob and Lefgren 2004) show that remedial
private tutoring improves student performance, this result may hold only for the
grades evaluated.
It is not easy to take account of this heterogeneity in returns to private tutoring.
Doing so requires detailed data on the student variables that may affect returns, as
well as more sophisticated estimation techniques. Crafting more detailed policies
demands more in-depth analysis of specific groups in particular contexts.
Third, the evidence presented here on the returns to investment in private
tutoring refers only to private returns. Little is known about the social returns to
private tutoring. Even if tutoring is completely financed by households, any
externalities of private tutoring would need to be estimated before social returns
could be calculated (but see discussion below on the social costs of tutoring in a
signaling equilibrium).
Subject to these caveats, it appears that tutoring has strong positive private
returns as a supplement to formal public school education. The programs on
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which there is evidence may provide good starting points for policymakers
seeking to design and implement supplementary education programs.
What Stance Should Policymakers Take toward Tutoring?
Efficiency and Equity Considerations
How does private tutoring affect efficiency and equity? This section first analyzes
this question while maintaining the assumptions that the market is perfect and
the supply curve for public schooling perfectly inelastic after a certain point. It
then examines how these conclusions change when these assumptions are
relaxed.
Efficiency Considerations in the Standard Case
The micro evidence on private tutoring suggests that it generally improves
student academic performance for the average tutored student. More limited evi-
dence suggests that these improvements can be cost-effective. A question for pol-
icymakers is whether, from a broader social perspective, the availability of private
tutoring increases overall welfare. Are the societal gains from private tutoring
likely to exceed its costs?
No studies appear to have been conducted on the efficiency of private tutoring
at the macro level. However, combining the micro evidence with the analytical
framework set forth above can help answer this question.
The availability of private tutoring increases efficiency and welfare, under
certain assumptions revisited below (figure 1). For a household whose demand
for education is represented by demand curve D2, the availability of private tutor-
ing raises consumption of education to Q*2. This is more than the amount of
public education (Q2) that the household consumes in the absence of private
tutoring and more than the amount of private education (Q0) that the household
can afford. (If the household’s demand for education is on the low-demand curve,
D1, the household would consume no private tutoring given this supply curve.)
Household consumer surplus increases by the amount represented by the triangle
BCE. Tutors gain the producer surplus represented by the triangle ABE.
One other effect is not shown directly in figure 1. High-demand households
that in the absence of private tutoring would have chosen private schools may
now enroll their children in public school. As demand for public schools increases,
the costs to the government might be expected to rise and the producer surplus to
private schools to fall. But because public schools are assumed to be on the verti-
cal portion of their supply curve—that is, they have reached their capacity—the
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quantity of education provided by the government (and therefore government
outlays) does not actually increase. Standard micro analysis makes it clear that
the total gains to households and tutors should exceed the losses in the private
school sector. Thus offering the opportunity to supplement public education with
private tutoring increases welfare for households and society as a whole—at least
in the standard model.
Equity Considerations in the Standard Case
Suppose policymakers are convinced that a robust private tutoring sector
improves welfare but worry that it may increase inequality. There is indeed reason
for concern. More privileged households—those with higher income and more
education who live in urban areas—invest more in tutoring than other house-
holds do, and private tutoring appears to increase learning achievements for
these children, at least on average. If learning achievement translates into higher
lifetime earnings, one would expect the availability of household-financed tutoring
to increase social inequalities.
One should not be too quick to equate tutoring with increasing inequality,
however, or to assume that an equity-focused government should try to limit
tutoring, for several reasons. First, when the appropriate counterfactual—what
would happen in the absence of a private tutoring sector—is specified, tutoring
may not increase educational inequality by as much as suggested above. Even
productive tutoring may confer only a minor advantage on children from weal-
thier and more-educated households, because these households already give their
children educational advantages in many other ways—by providing them with
more books, more learning equipment, and even full-time private schooling, for
example, or by teaching their children themselves. Even if it were enforceable, a
ban on private tutoring would likely simply redirect the education expenditures of
better-off households into these other investments. Furthermore, access to sup-
plementary private tutoring may benefit poorer households if it helps their chil-
dren compete with wealthier children enrolled in private schools.
Second, tutoring may emerge as an unintended result of other government
education policies, including some policies aimed at promoting equity. Imagine,
for example, that the government substantially increases its per student financing
for public education in poor (low-demand) neighborhoods. This would shift the
supply curve (S2 in figure 1) downward. If the shift is substantial enough, it will
induce low-demand households to consume more education, including more
private tutoring.
To control educational inequality, governments may find it more effective to
attack its roots than to discourage tutoring, which is in part a symptom of
inequality. Korea took this tack in 1974, when it sought to control the growth of
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private tutoring by adopting a secondary school equalization program (Kim
2005). That program switched to allocating secondary school entrance by lottery
rather than examination, reducing the quality advantages of higher-ranking
schools and the incentive for exam-preparation tutoring. While demand for tutor-
ing has remained high, Korea is not generally believed to have severe intergenera-
tional transmission of inequality through education.
Third, governments can use tutoring to improve equity. The household-
financed tutoring in the market equilibrium in figure 1 benefits children from
high-demand households, which tend to be wealthier, but governments and
others can target special tutoring programs at underperforming students, as
Israel (Lavy and Schlosser 2005) and the United States (Jacob and Lefgren 2004)
have done. In effect, the government would be segmenting the market depicted in
figure 1 by driving the supply curve downward for low-demand households only.
In this case the equity implications are clearly positive, as long as the subsidy is
financed progressively.
What if the Availability of Tutoring Impedes Public School Improvements?
The first assumption that needs to be relaxed is that public education is capacity-
constrained—meaning that at the upper end of its range the supply of education
is perfectly inelastic. This assumption is likely to hold only in the short term. Over
the longer run, governments can and do take steps to increase the quantity of
effective education, for example by expanding school capacity to allow longer
schooling hours, improving teacher attendance and time on task, and ultimately
hiring more teachers and building more schools. Such improvements extend
the upward-sloping portion of the public supply curve in figure 1 and shift the
vertical section outward.
Distinguishing between the short and long runs therefore matters. Under the
earlier assumptions of the short-run standardized framework model depicted in
figure 1, private tutoring occupied a neutral territory unaffected by the debate
that pits public schools against private ones. Public and private schools are typi-
cally depicted as substitutes, which they generally are, at least at the level of the
individual student (from the perspective of the school system as a whole, private
schools may be viewed as a useful complement to government schools). But in
the situation depicted in figure 1, tutoring is a complement to public schooling. It
enables parents to invest in an optimal amount of education for their children,
increasing both consumer and producer surplus.
Thus private tutoring and public education appear to be complements in the
short run. In the long run—defined here as the time it takes to make substantial
improvements in the quality and quantity of public schooling—private tutoring
may substitute for public education. The availability of tutoring could diminish
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parents’ interest in lobbying for long-term improvements in public education. If
urban elites find that tutoring gives their children an advantage in competitive
examinations or the labor market and they fear that any future public school
improvements would go primarily to schools serving disadvantaged areas, they
may prefer the status quo. In Japan it has been argued that education reforms to
expand public school activities have been blocked by the dependence on private
tutoring to perform these tasks (LeTendre 1994). The tutoring market may serve
as an outlet releasing political pressure for reform and quality improvement.
In the long run, private tutoring may provide less of a spur to public quality
than competition from private schools does. Some scholars (Hoxby 1994; Rouse
1998; Bishop and Wossman 2004) argue that the loss (or potential loss) of
students to private schools puts pressure on public schools to improve quality.
Private tutoring would likely have no such effect, because it does not cause
students to abandon public schools.
The question is not whether private tutoring enables or undermines the public
sector’s role as a provider of education. Public schooling will continue to be a
part of virtually every national primary and secondary school system. The point
is simply that where tutoring is widespread, it will likely have important effects on
the quality and efficiency of public schools. Policy will need to take account of
these effects over both the short and long terms.
What if Teacher Corruption makes the Tutoring Market Uncompetitive?
A second assumption underlying the standardized model is that the market for
tutoring is competitive. This may not be the case. Public school teachers may have
substantial market power as suppliers of private tutoring, especially in remote rural
areas, where they may be the only potential suppliers of private tutoring.
More worrisome is the fact that teachers who are corrupt and poorly monitored
sometimes force their public school students to take private tutoring lessons from
them or omit part of the curriculum during regular classroom hours and save
it for their tutoring lessons (Buchmann 1999; Foondun 2002; Glewwe and
Jayachandran 2006; Silova and Bray 2006a). Others give preferential treatment
to particular children in return for a fee. This practice may reduce teacher time
and energy in mainstream classes, or it may encourage teachers to work
additional hours.
Teachers’ monopoly power reduces the consumer surplus of high-demand con-
sumers. The dysfunctional monitoring system coupled with teacher corruption
blurs the line between public education and private tutoring. Graphically, this
would increase the slope of the (now ostensibly public) supply curve S2 and shift
it to the left in figure 1, forcing households to pay a higher price for the same
amount of education. The more market power teachers have, the farther leftward
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they may try to shift the supply curve. As one would expect, given teachers’ mon-
opoly power, consumer surplus falls by more than the gain in producer surplus to
the teacher. In such cases, private tutoring is not likely to yield the substantial
returns to tutoring documented in the empirical studies cited above.
This outcome is worse than the no-corruption competitive private tutoring
equilibrium; for households it may also be worse than having no tutoring at all.
In the worst case, tutoring fees are simply a net transfer from households to tea-
chers: the amount of education provided remains the same, but the teacher deli-
vers part of it for a fee outside of school hours. In rural areas, where teacher
governance is poor and this type of corruption is most likely to flourish, the trans-
fer will usually be regressive, because teachers tend to have considerably higher
incomes than the average rural resident. Moreover, evidence on service delivery
suggests that it is the poorest households that suffer most from failures in service
delivery (World Bank 2003) and pay the largest bribes relative to their consump-
tion level (Hunt and Laszlo 2005). As a result, the transfer will likely reduce
equity and overall welfare.
This analysis of potential teacher corruption suggests that in the absence of
mechanisms to control teacher corruption, allowing private tutoring may be
counterproductive in some cases. Given the difficulties and undesirability of
banning tutoring outright, it provides a rationale for measures to prevent public
school teachers from tutoring their own students privately. Ukraine’s education
ministry imposed such a ban in 2004 in response to complaints from parents that
teachers were providing “compulsory private tutoring” (Hrynevych and others
2006).
What if the Purpose of Tutoring is not only to Increase Human Capital?
How does the diagnosis change if tutoring is not necessarily productive from a
societal perspective? The analysis assumed that an increase in education units
consumed not only increases a student’s future productivity (and hence wages)
but also increases societal productivity by an equivalent amount. In theory this
need not be the case. If tests measure student characteristics that have signaling
value but no productive value, tutoring may not increase the productivity of
tutored students, even though it increases their wages. This would be the extreme
version of the signaling model introduced by Spence (1973). In such a signaling
equilibrium policymakers would be right to worry about the social costs of the
tutoring industry, which would in essence be an arms merchant in a negative-
sum education arms race.
While this extreme theoretical case certainly does not apply anywhere, criticism
of some aspects of otherwise high-performing education systems in Korea and
Japan—both of which have very large private tutoring sectors—has cited the
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perceived uselessness of some of the material tutoring students master in pre-
paration for university entrance examinations. Concerns about the heavy finan-
cial burden of tutoring on parents have led to reform in Korea (Kim 2001).
These concerns are consistent with the argument that the long-term financial
returns do not justify the costs of private tutoring. Empirical evidence suggests a
bunching of private tutoring investment immediately before school-leaving or uni-
versity entrance exams, which is consistent with a signaling story. Standardized
tests for admission to law school in the United States, which have given rise to a
large test-preparation industry, have been criticized for being widely used despite
their inability to predict applicants’ performance as lawyers (Haddon and Post
2006). The fact that students in the United States prepare for the Law School
Admission Test (LSAT)—supposedly an aptitude test—by acquiring test-taking
skills taught in tutoring courses suggests that the test results contain an element
of signaling. If tutoring were contributing only to productive human capital, it
would not likely raise scores on an aptitude test, at least not as a result of the
short courses offered by tutoring companies.
Although it is analytically difficult to distinguish between the signaling and
productive human capital stories, signaling incentives are likely to explain some
tutoring in societies that make heavy use of tutoring (Rogers 1996; Chae, Hong,
and Lee 2004; Lee 2007). But three points should be kept in mind. First,
although a ( partial) signaling story changes the situation depicted in figure 1 to
a degree, it does not qualitatively change the conclusions. A signaling equilibrium
makes the slope of the private tutoring supply curve steeper, by reducing the effec-
tive units of education (human capital) received, but the outcome does not
change fundamentally.
Second, countries such as Korea that apparently make greater use of signaling
are among the highest performers on well-designed, internationally normed student
assessments such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)
and the TIMSS. These high scores suggest that students are acquiring a large
amount of real human capital even if they are also investing in signaling value.
Third, the appropriate response in the signaling case is probably not to discou-
rage tutoring—as Korea did in 1980 by banning it—but to address the problem
at its source. The government could, for example, revise university admissions
policies so that they place less reliance on a single examination, which makes for
a tempting signal of a student’s ability.
Policy Implications
The evidence suggests that tutoring can raise educational outcomes as a comp-
lement to formal school systems. In the absence of corruption, and given the
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assumptions discussed above, private tutoring increases the welfare of households
and society as a whole. Private tutoring may place poorer households at some dis-
advantage relative to richer households, however, particularly when corruption
distorts the tutoring market. Corruption also reduces the efficiency of the tutoring
equilibrium. This section explores what these drawbacks imply for education
policy in developing countries.
Government Policy and the Control of Corruption
Before turning to policy recommendations, it is useful to consider the policies govern-
ments have implemented. Bray (2003) divides governments into four types: those
that ban private tutoring (type I), those that ignore it (type II), those that recognize
and regulate it (type III), and those that actively encourage it (type IV; table 3).
Bray and Silova (Bray 2003, 2006; Silova and Bray 2006b) offer helpful detail
on the different types of governments. They note that type I governments all
failed in their attempts to ban private tutoring. Bans in Cambodia and Myanmar
failed because those countries’ institutions were too weak to implement the policy.
In Korea and Mauritius the bans faced too much opposition from vested interests,
forcing the governments to lift the bans and regulate private tutoring.
Type II governments ignore private tutoring. These governments can be divided
into two groups based on their reasons for ignoring private tutoring. Countries in
the first group (including Nigeria and Sri Lanka) have weak institutions and little
capacity to monitor private tutoring. Countries in the second group (including
Canada and the United Kingdom) have stronger institutions and adequate
capacity to monitor private tutoring. They choose not to regulate the sector,
either because they consider it to have small and insignificant effects or because
they prefer to let market forces govern the sector.
Type III governments (such as Hong Kong, China; Mauritius; and Vietnam)
take a more active role in controlling private tutoring. These governments recog-
nize the importance of private tutoring and attempt to control it both directly and
indirectly. They may prohibit private tutoring in early grades; forbid teachers from
tutoring their own students; stipulate fees, class sizes, or syllabi for private tutor-
ing classes; and reduce disparities across schools.
Type IV governments (including Singapore, South Africa, Tanzania) actively
encourage private tutoring. These governments believe that private tutoring con-
tributes to human capital development and that private tutoring is an effective
means of tailoring education to the needs of students. Policies in type IV countries
range from offering general encouragement to providing subsidies for private
tutoring, training courses for tutors, and tax incentives.
It may be useful to add another dimension to this framework: control of cor-
ruption (see table 3). By this measure (taken from Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi
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Table 3. Government Policies toward Private Tutoring in Selected Economies
Type Policy Measure Country Comment
I Prohibit private
tutoring
Total ban on private tutoring. Cambodia (7), Republic of Korea (65),
Myanmar (1), Mauritius (67)
Tutoring was banned, but the bans were
ineffective because of government’s
inability to enforce them.
II Ignore private
tutoring
Croatia (58), Georgia (45), Nigeria (6),
Mongolia (37), Sri Lanka (49)
Most of these countries have weak
institutions and do not have the
capacity to regulate private tutoring.
Canada (94), United Kingdom (94) These countries have strong institutions
and the capacity to regulate private
tutoring, but they consider the private
tutoring market outside of their sphere
of responsibility.
III Recognize and
regulate private
tutoring
Generally prohibit private tutoring in early
grades and prohibit teachers from
tutoring their own students. Regulations
are accompanied by inspections and
sanctions on private tutoring fees, class
sizes, and syllabi. Regulations are placed
on infrastructure of private tutoring
centers. Policies seek to reduce
stratification in the education system,
reduce disparities in schools, and raise
public awareness about negative effects of
private tutoring.
Hong Kong (China) (93), Lithuania
(60), Republic of Korea (65),
Mauritius (67), Ukraine (28),
Vietnam (29)
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IV Actively encourage
private tutoring
Provide subsidies for private tutoring,
disseminate information to link potential
tutors and clients, offer training courses
for tutors, and provide tax incentives for
tutoring.
Singapore (98), South Africa (71),
Tanzania (43)
These countries believe that private
tutoring contributes to human capital
development and caters to the needs of
students.
Note: Measures shown are for illustration purposes only; countries in each category may not implement all measures. The numbers in parentheses indicate
percentile ranking in control of corruption (higher rankings represent greater control). The timing of the corruption measure does not always coincide with the timing
of government actions. However, in all countries except Tanzania there has been little change in this index over time.
Source: Bray (2003, 2006); Silova and Bray (2006b); for Croatia, Dedic and others (2006); for Mongolia, Matiashvili and Kutateladze (2006); for Georgia, Dong and
others (2006); for Lithuania, Budiene and Zabulionis (2006); for Ukraine, Hrynevych and others (2006); and for Vietnam, Dang (2007a). Corruption rankings are
from Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi (2007).
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2007), the first group in type I governments appears to have weak control of cor-
ruption, while the second group has sound control of corruption. (It should be
remembered that neither group was successful in banning private tutoring.)
Among type II governments, the first group has only weak to moderate control
over corruption, while the second group has strong control. Control in Type III
governments ranges from weak to strong; control in type IV governments ranges
from moderate to strong. These associations between type and governance quality
should be useful in gauging the feasibility of different policies.
A (tentative) Agenda for Policy Toward Private Tutoring
Some tentative policy recommendations can be proposed based on these results
and the casual (but intuitive) observations about the association between corrup-
tion and government policies. First, since private tutoring is widespread and
growing, it is time for governments to devote more attention to it. The benign
neglect policy of type II governments runs the risk of letting tutoring-related cor-
ruption go unchecked in countries with weak control over corruption. Even
countries in this group with stronger control over corruption may be missing
opportunities to use tutoring to address imbalances between education supply
and demand. Possible government actions range from monitoring (for example,
collecting data on private tutoring attendance and private tutoring businesses) to
trying to ensure that private tutoring can operate free of corruption and
unnecessary barriers to competition.
There is still too little empirical evidence on the macro-level determinants of
private tutoring. In particular, more cross-country data need to be collected to
allow researchers to tease out the impacts of government policies and interven-
tions (including, for example, education subsidies, public expenditure on edu-
cation, high-stakes testing systems) on creating demand for private tutoring.
At the micro level, more research should be conducted on the household
decision to send children to school (for example, the choice of private education
over public education, with or without private tutoring; the choice between
investing in the quantity and the “quality” of children), as well as the short- and
long-term effects of private tutoring on student well-being (for example, student
satisfaction levels, health status, labor-market outcomes, and so forth). Research
should also investigate whether social returns to private tutoring differ from
private returns.
Second, while it may be welfare enhancing to ban private tutoring when all
tutoring is provided by corrupt teachers, a total ban is difficult to implement and
is likely to have the unintended effect of preventing more beneficial tutoring by
tutors who are not corrupt. Resources would be better allocated to monitoring
and regulating—rather than trying to eradicate—private tutoring. Regulatory
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approaches can focus on reducing opportunities for corruption by prohibiting
public school teachers from tutoring their own students.
Third, private tutoring markets in economies with low levels of corruption are
likely to be more competitive than those in economies in which corruption is
more entrenched. If this is the case, private tutoring is likely to be welfare enhan-
cing. Governments may even want to encourage the private tutoring industry, as
Singapore, South Africa, and Tanzania have done. Policymakers should monitor
the development of the industry and address concerns. This may require going to
the root of the education quality problem rather than holding the private tutoring
sector responsible. Where tutoring appears to exacerbate social and geographical
inequalities, government action will be most effective if it targets the source of the
underlying inequalities, possibly by equalizing public school finance across rich
and poor districts.
Finally, governments may want to explore financing tutoring programs as a
flexible means of educating disadvantaged children. While more evidence is
needed, the findings on targeted government- and NGO-financed tutoring pro-
grams suggest that this can be an effective means of improving education out-
comes for disadvantaged children. Such programs have the added benefit of
avoiding any equity-efficiency tradeoffs: by increasing the productivity of disad-
vantaged children, they promote equity goals as well.
Appendix A
Table A.1. Incidence of Private Tutoring in Selected Countries
Source Country Year
Level, grade, or
age
Percentage of
students tutored Comment
Silova and
Kazimzade (2006)
Azerbaijan 2004 Secondary
school
57
University 92 First-year university
students received
private tutoring in
their last year of
secondary school.
Ahmed et al. (2005) Bangladesh 2004 Primary
school
43 More boys received
tutoring than girls.
Bray (1999b) Cambodia 1997–98 Primary
school
31 Some 90 percent of
students in urban
schools and 9
percent in rural
Continued
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Table A.1. Continued
Source Country Year
Level, grade, or
age
Percentage of
students tutored Comment
schools received
private tutoring.
CME (2000) Canada 1999 13- and 16-
year-olds
5–17 for 13-year-
olds, 8–20 for
16-year-olds
Aurini and Davies
(2004)
Canada 1997 School-age
children
n.a. Between 1974 and
2004, the number
of formal tutoring
businesses in major
Canadian cities
grew 200–500
percent.
Stylianou et al.
(2003)
Cyprus 2003 University 86 The surveyed
university students
reported that they
received private
tutoring in upper
secondary school.
Suliman and El-
Kogali (2002)
Egypt, Arab
Rep. of
2000 Children 6–
15
71 Data are from Egypt
Demographic and
Health Survey.
Psacharopoulous
and
Papakonstantinou
(2005)
Greece 2000 University 80 percent
attended group
(cram)
preparatory
schools, 50
percent received
individual private
tutoring, 33
percent received
both group and
individual
tutoring
Bray and Kwok
(2003)
Hong Kong,
China
1996–98 Secondary
school
35 percent in
grades 1–3; 47
percent in grades
4–5; and 70
percent in grades
6–7
NCES (1996) Japan 1995 Grade 8 64 percent of
eighth graders
received weekly
Data are from 1995
Trends in
International
Continued
190 The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 23, no. 2 (Fall 2008)
Table A.1. Continued
Source Country Year
Level, grade, or
age
Percentage of
students tutored Comment
tutoring in
mathematics; 41
percent received
weekly tutoring
in science
Mathematics and
Science Study.
Onsomu et al.
(2005)
Kenya 2000 Grade 6 88 Proportion of
students that
reported receiving
private tutoring
rose from 69
percent in 1998 to
88 percent in 2000.
Data are from
Southern and
Eastern Africa
Consortium for
Monitoring
Education Quality
(SACMEQ) II.
Kwak (2004) Republic of
Korea
2003 Primary
school
83 Overall, 73 percent
of Korean students
received private
tutoring. Study cites
estimates from the
Korean Educational
Development
Institute.
Middle
school
75
High school 56
Budiene and
Zabulionis (2006)
Lithuania 2004–05 University 62
Kulpoo and
Soonarane (2005)
Mauritius 2001 Grade 6 87 Proportion of pupils
who received
private tutoring
rose from 78
percent in 1995 to
87 percent in 2001.
Vast majority (91
percent) of students
receiving tutoring
paid for it. Data are
from the Southern
and Eastern Africa
Consortium for
Continued
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Table A.1. Continued
Source Country Year
Level, grade, or
age
Percentage of
students tutored Comment
Monitoring
Education Quality
(SACMEQ) II.
UNESCO (2000) Romania 1994 Grade 12 32 in rural areas
and 58 in urban
areas received
private
supplementary
tutoring
Study cites estimates
from study
undertaken by
Romanian Institute
for Sciences of
Education on
national sample of
12th graders.
George (1992) Singapore 1992 Primary
school
49
Secondary
school
30
Glewwe and
Jayachandran
(2006)
Sri Lanka 2003 Grade 5 78
Paviot, Heinsohn
and Korkman
(2008)
Tanzania 2000 Grade 6 56 The proportion of
students receiving
private tutoring
rose from 46
percent in 1995 to
56 percent in 2000.
Data are from
Southern and
Eastern Africa
Consortium for
Monitoring
Education Quality
(SACMEQ) II
Tansel and Bircan
(2006)
Turkey 2001 High school 35 Number of private
tutoring centers
rose from 174 in
1984 to 2,100 in
2002—close to the
number of high
schools in Turkey
(2,500). Study uses
estimates from
Turkey’s Private
Tutoring Centers
Continued
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Table A.1. Continued
Source Country Year
Level, grade, or
age
Percentage of
students tutored Comment
Association in
2003.
Hrynevych et al.
(2006)
Ukraine 2004 University 68 Students received
private tutoring
during last year of
secondary school.
Ireson and
Rushforth (2005)
United
Kingdom
2003 Grades 6
and 11
26
Grade 13 30
Gordon and Gordon
(2003)
United States 2000 Elementary
school
n.a. Almost 7 million
elementary school
students are
believed to have
received tutoring;
tutoring industry
earned $5–8
billion.
Briggs (2001) United States 1990–92 High school 14–21 percent
took special
courses to
prepare for SAT/
ACT; 8–14
percent received
private group
tutoring
(commercial
coaching
classes); 6–8
percent received
one-to-one
private tutoring
Dang (2007b) Vietnam 1997–98 Primary
school
31 About 34 percent of
households with
children in school
sent their children
to private tutors,
with 90 percent of
them allocating
1–5 percent of
household
expenditure to
private tutoring.
Lower-
secondary
school
56
Upper-
secondary
school
77
Continued
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Working Paper 4530 under the title “How to Interpret the Growing Phenomenon of Private
Tutoring: Human Capital Deepening, Inequality Increasing, or Waste of Resources?”
1. The focus in this article is on private tutoring for academic subjects. Lipscomb (2007) and
Barron, Ewing, and Waddell (2000) among others examine how nonacademic extracurricular
involvement affects academic achievement.
2. The number of private tutoring colleges listed in the Yellow Pages in Sydney—the largest city
in Australia—increased from 60 in 1989 to 222 in 2002 (Kenny and Faunce 2004). More evidence
on the growth of private tutoring for several countries in Southern and Eastern Africa can be found
in Paviot, Heinsohn, and Korkman (2008).
3. The public education system is known for its rigidity, lack of teacher incentives and account-
ability, and inadequate infrastructure, particularly in developing countries (Glewwe and Kremer
2006). Teacher absenteeism is also common in many countries (Chaudhury and others 2006). The
supply curve need not become completely inelastic at the upper end (it is shown as such here only
for ease of exposition); all that is necessary is that at the margin the public system be less able or
willing to provide additional lessons than the private tutoring sector is.
4. Note that this is the (subsidized) public education supply curve—that is, the supply curve as
viewed by households—not the underlying marginal cost of supplying public education. The cost of
public schooling to households is assumed to be less than the cost of private schools, even though
the underlying cost for private schools to produce education may be lower. No assumptions are
made about the unit cost of private tutoring relative to the unit cost of private schools; the advan-
tage of private tutors is their flexibility and ability to supplement the public system by providing as
many additional hours (lessons) as households demand.
5. The dependent variables and other control variables differ across the models used in the
studies for each country. The study of Japan, for example, looks at the probability that students
participate in after-school private tutoring classes. The other studies assess the determinants of
expenditure on private tutoring at the household or child level. Only the study of Egypt controls for
parental presence in the household, and only the study of Turkey controls for whether the mother is
single.
Table A.1. Continued
Source Country Year
Level, grade, or
age
Percentage of
students tutored Comment
Machingaidze et al.
(1998)
Zimbabwe 1995 Grade 6 61 Prevalence of
tutoring ranged
from 36 to 74
percent across
regions.
n.a., not available.
Source: Based largely on Table II.1 in Dang (2007a).
194 The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 23, no. 2 (Fall 2008)
6. One rebel group in the northeastern state of Manipur in India has reportedly forbidden
teachers and professors to provide private tutoring classes, in an attempt to stop the widespread
situation in which they do not come to class because they are too busy supplementing their low
salaries by tutoring. Not surprisingly, even the government-appointed official in charge of higher
education in Manipur sympathizes with the rebels’ efforts (Chronicle of Higher Education 2003).
7. The direction of bias depends on the correlation between income levels and the private tutor-
ing variables. If this correlation is positive, the coefficients on the share of public expenditure in
GNP and gross enrollment rates would be biased upward; if they are negative, the coefficients would
be biased downward.
8. Difference-in-difference comparisons of randomized control trials treat the before-to-after
changes in the control group as a baseline and then see how much the before-to-after changes in
the experimental group deviate from this baseline. Another variant of the randomized experiment
method is regression discontinuity design, which takes advantage of what are in effect natural
experiments in the region around a discrete (and exogenous) jump in the variable of interest. For a
rigorous treatment of these econometric methods see Wooldridge (2002).
9. Instrumental variables attempt to deal with endogeneity by isolating and using only the
exogenous component of the variable of interest.
10. The evidence that private tutoring raises achievement in the United States is overwhelming.
Other studies that find that private tutoring has positive effects on SAT scores include Becker (1990)
and Powers and Rock (1999). A meta-analysis study of the effects of one-on-one tutoring programs
in reading for elementary students with learning difficulties shows that these programs improve
student reading skills (Elbaum and others 2000).
11. Certain features of the Indonesian finding (in which one of the authors participated) may
restrict its general applicability. First, the test administered was simple: the math test consisted of
only 12 questions, and the dictation test consisted of a single short passage. Second, because data
on student attributes and investments were limited, the tutoring variable used was a crude one:
whether or not the student was currently receiving tutoring.
12. These calculations revise and update those in Dang (2007a) and are available on request.
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